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NOTES
SOTOMAYOR’S  EMPATHY  MOVES  THE  COURT  A
STEP  CLOSER  TO  EQUITABLE  ADJUDICATION
Veronica Couzo*
INTRODUCTION
On August 6, 2009, then-Judge, now-Justice, Sonia Sotomayor was con-
firmed as the nation’s first Latina Supreme Court Justice.1  While many Lati-
nos embraced the idea of having “Sonia from the Bronx”2 on the bench,
others were fearful that her jurisprudence, combined with her background,
would result in “reverse racism.”3  These fears, while arguably unfounded at
the time, have been completely dispelled.  Just as Justice Thurgood Marshall
transformed the adjudications of the Supreme Court through experiential
discourse, so too, to a lesser extent, has Justice Sotomayor.  In both oral argu-
ments and written opinions, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has demonstrated edu-
cative leadership—enlightening her colleagues to other perspectives—while
utilizing empathy shaped by her experiences to facilitate her decisionmaking.
This empathy has allowed her to give a voice to the habitually unheard,
which inevitably generates fairer decisions.
Part I discusses two competing theories of judicial adjudication: the
traditional model and the empathic model.  This Part will call attention to
the pitfalls of the formalist mode of decisionmaking, while contending that
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; Bachelor of Arts,
Political Science, Columbia University, 2010.  I would like to thank Judge Kenneth Ripple
for reading drafts of this Note and for offering his invaluable insight and guidance.  I also
owe my gratitude to the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their attentive editing.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Lidia and Pedro Couzo, for their eternal love and
support, as well as Nick Kamenjarin for his patience throughout this whole process.
1 Charlie Savage, Senate Confirms Sotomayor for the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2009, at A1.
2 Justice Sotomayor Prefers “Sonia from the Bronx,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 13, 2013, 8:07 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57563700/justice-sotomayor-prefers-sonia-
from-the-bronx/.
3 Newt Gingrich, Anne Coulter, and Rush Limbaugh each accused Sotomayor of
being racist. See Huma Khan & Jake Tapper, Newt Gingrich on Twitter: Sonia Sotomayor
‘Racist’, Should Withdraw, ABC NEWS (May 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
SoniaSotomayor/story?id=7685284#.UXQcpbVQHXM.
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the use of empathy is the more realistic and humane paradigm of adjudica-
tion.  This Part will also address and dispel some of the criticisms leveled at
empathic decisionmaking.  Part II maintains that in spite of the attacks
directed toward empathy, it has played a vital role in significant Supreme
Court decisions.  Both Brown v. Board of Education4 and Safford Unified School
District No. 1 v. Redding5 demonstrate how the use of empathy has allowed the
Court to reach more just and equitable decisions.  Part III examines Justice
Sotomayor’s empathic decision making.  This Part first provides a brief his-
tory of her life, highlighting the challenges she has overcome.  This Part then
discusses how Sotomayor believes empathy participates in the decisionmak-
ing process.  Finally, in examining oral arguments and her separate opinion
in Calhoun v. United States,6 this Part reveals that, while Sotomayor’s empathy
gives a voice to those who are typically less heard, it does not amount to bias.
In fact, her majority opinion in J.D.B. v. North Carolina7 refutes accusations of
unfair bias by demonstrating how the use of empathy facilitated Sotomayor’s
ability to be influenced by other perspectives.  By taking into account the
real-world consequences of her decisions, and acknowledging the litigants’
differing perspectives, Sotomayor assists the Court in reaching more even-
handed decisions.
I. FORMALISM V. EMPATHY IN ADJUDICATION
A. The Traditional View: Formalism
In the nineteenth century, the central legal theory was formalism.
Under this paradigm, it was understood that “judges decided cases in
mechanical, ‘scientific’ fashion.”8  Judges were likened to pharmacists, pre-
scribing the appropriate rule to correct the legal issue presented.9  The
human element of judicial decisionmaking was altogether rejected; judges
were merely the instrument through which relevant legal rules were applied
to the particulars of a controversy.
Today, this view, which demands that judges abandon the lessons
learned from life experiences, has softened slightly.  Judge Cardozo was
instrumental in the transformation of the prevailing legal theory by calling
attention to the impracticability of such a model: “We may try to see things as
objectively as we please.  None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
6 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013).
7 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
8 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of Law,” 42 REC. ASS’N B.
CITY N.Y. 948, 952 (1987); see also Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empa-
thy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 315–17
(2012); Robert N. Wilentz, Judicial Legitimacy—Finding the Law, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221,
228 (1985).
9 Brennan, supra note 8, at 951–52.
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except our own.”10  To put it simply, a judge cannot separate herself from
the experiences that have shaped her,11 nor should she have to.
Judge Cardozo’s insights have become established in legal jurisprudence
and have triggered various gradations of formalism.  While there are those
who still believe in “the myth of judge-as-oracle,”12 there are others who pro-
pose a quasi-formalist approach.  In this method of adjudication, a judge is
not a robot, but must “exercise good judgment in reaching decisions.”13
Judges are required to implement discretion when settling factual disputes
and ambiguities in the law,14 but “[e]mpathy has no place” in this process.15
Therefore, a judge is expected to bear in mind her life experiences, but is
prohibited from utilizing empathy.16
A rejection of empathy, however, can lead to devastating outcomes for
the litigants involved in a case.  The decision reached in Plessy v. Ferguson17
serves as one example.18  The Court in Plessy—which upheld institutional-
10 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).
11 See id. at 168 (“[Judges] do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and
we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do.  The great tides
and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the
judges by.”).
12 Brennan, supra note 8, at 953.  For instance, Justice Roberts championed this view
in his confirmation hearing.  “Judges are like umpires,” Roberts pronounced, stating
“Umpires don’t make the rules. They apply them.”  Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy,
NEW YORKER (May 25, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525
fa_fact_toobin?currentPage=all.  Interestingly, however, Chief Justice Roberts has proved
to be much more than just an umpire, exhibiting a one-sided view in decisionmaking.  “In
every major case since he became the nation’s seventeenth Chief Justice, Roberts has sided
with the prosecution over the defendant, the state over the condemned, the executive
branch over the legislative, and the corporate defendant over the individual plaintiff.” Id.
13 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1663,
1679 (2010).
14 Id. (“Judges are expected, for example, to exercise discretion in resolving factual
disputes and ambiguities in the law itself.” (footnote omitted)).  For more about the law’s
ambiguities, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–54 (2d ed. 1994).  Specifically,
Hart contended that in the legal system a great deal “is left open for the exercise of discre-
tion by courts and other officials in rendering initially vague standards determinate, in
resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly
communicated by authoritative precedents.” Id. at 136.
15 Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 1679 (“[T]he fact that some discretion lies at the heart
of the judicial function does not justify utilizing personal, subjective criteria either to cre-
ate ambiguity or to resolve it.  Empathy has no place in the typical factual determination.”).
16 Empathy takes place when a judge views legal problems from the perspectives of the
parties before her. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18 Justice Brennan considers Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the
Court struck down a statute that limited the number of hours per week that bakery employ-
ees could work, to provide another example of what can happen when the Supreme Court
reaches a decision absent empathy. See Brennan, supra note 8, at 959–61.  He argued that
while the decision “made logical sense,” the Court, in desiring to stick to pure reason, had
a flawed and one-sided conception of liberty. Id. at 960.  In overlooking “the plight of an
employee whose only ‘choice’ is between working the hours the employer demands or not
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ized segregation—failed to take into account segregation’s adverse effects on
black Americans.  By opining that racial segregation did not “destroy the
legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servi-
tude[,]”19 the Court did not appreciate the drastic consequences of segrega-
tion.  The question of whether a law upholds human dignity can only be
answered in the details of everyday life.  In Plessy, the Court evidently chose
to ignore experience, demonstrating a complete unwillingness to empathize
with those subjected to discrimination.  Indeed, the Court maintained that
segregation made blacks feel inferior “solely because the colored race
[chooses] to put that construction upon it.”20  This “ivory-towered analysis of
the real world”21 neglected the experience of a whole race, and consequently
endorsed the subordination of many citizens.
B. Empathy
An empathic response is one that involves the “psychological processes
that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s
situation than with his own situation.”22  According to Justice Brennan,
empathy is attentiveness to the range of human experience as well as a
“[s]ensitivity to one’s intuitive and passionate responses.”23  It is a corollary
of “the heart rather than the head”24 that “puts [judges] in touch with the
dreams and disappointments of those with whom they deal.”25  Thus, judicial
empathy takes place when a judge enters the “skin” of another, making a
litigant’s experience part of the judge’s experience.26  This can occur either
when a judge has personal understanding of the situation at hand, or when a
judge, through a concerted effort, envisions the circumstances of another.27
Consequently, empathy empowers the decisionmaker to give voice to the too
working at all[,]” the Court did not succeed in fulfilling its constitutional duty to protect
liberty. Id. at 960–61.
19 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543.
20 Id. at 551.
21 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 630 n.4 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using
this phrase to describe the majority opinion, which failed to take into account the exper-
iences of minorities).
22 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 30 (2000); see THE AMERI-
CAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 428 (8th ed. 1971) (defining empa-
thy as “[u]nderstanding so intimate that the feelings, thoughts, and motives of one are
readily comprehended by another”).  Although there are differing conceptions of empa-
thy, this is the definition that will apply to empathy discussed in this Note.
23 Brennan, supra note 8, at 959.
24 Id. at 958.
25 Id. at 970.
26 See Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
507, 521 (1990).
27 See Catherine Gage O’Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4, 9
(2001) (“In judicial decisionmaking, empathy is the attempt actively to imagine the situa-
tions of others as an integral part of deciding a case on the law.” (footnote omitted)).
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often unheard by urging judges to imagine and attempt to understand the
“outsider” perspective.28
Critics of empathy believe that such an approach defies the traditional
creed that judges should be purely objective.  They insist that an empathic
connection prevents judges from adjudicating solely on the mandates of
law.29  In their view, if a judge identifies with a particular community of peo-
ple, that judge’s impartiality is undermined because she may feel accountable
to that community.  In reality, however, all “judges have had life experiences
that could be said to affect [their] perception of the cases” before them.30
For instance, Justice Alito admitted that his upbringing shapes his perspec-
tive of cases involving immigrants.31  Nevertheless, these life experiences do
not prohibit judges from impartially ruling on cases in which the issues or the
facts are in some way indirectly related to their personal experiences.32  Since
empathic judges envision, comprehend, and contemplate each party’s view-
point, such a judge is more likely to reach a just decision by simply acknowl-
edging the natural inclination to empathize with those who are most similar
to oneself.33  By identifying her affinities, a judge will be prompted to
uncover other perspectives that were not immediately perceptible to her.
Additionally, a sense of connection with a particular community should be
encouraged because it motivates judges to accept responsibility for the conse-
quences their decisions have on individuals.
28 See id. at 13 n.50 (“The outsider perspective is commonly misunderstood or ignored
for a number of reasons including (1) it is a different life story told by someone outside the
mainstream; thus, it does not resonate easily with those in the mainstream; (2) there is
often no one in the system who assumes the responsibility, as a part of their job, for
attempting to understand this perspective; and (3) the actual process of obtaining an
empathic perspective is just plain difficult—it takes time and it is hard work.”).
29 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 69 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judici-
ary) (“[Sotomayor has] evidenced, I think it is quite clear, a philosophy of the law that
suggests that a judge’s background and experiences can and should—even should and
naturally will impact their decision, which I think goes against the American ideal and oath
that a judge takes to be fair to every party, and every day when they put on that robe, that is
a symbol that they are to put aside their personal biases and prejudices.”).
30 Miles v. Ryan, 697 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012).
31 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 475 (2006) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito) (“[I]n my opening statement, I tried
to provide a little picture of who I am as a human being and how my background and my
experiences have shaped me and brought me to this point. . . . [W]hen a case comes
before me involving, let’s say, someone who is an immigrant, . . . I can’t help but think of
my own ancestors because it wasn’t that long ago when they were in that position.  And so
it’s my job to apply the law. . . . [B]ut I have to, when I look at those cases, I have to say to
myself, and I do say to myself, this could be your grandfather.”).
32 See Miles, 697 F.3d at 1091.
33 See O’Grady, supra note 27, at 13.
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While opponents of the empathic theory contend that employing empa-
thy amounts to bias, the reality is that those who fail to view cases from each
litigant’s perspective are the least apt to adjudicate equitably.  Indeed, “[i]t is
those judges who are unable to understand the views and problems of
others—who are unable to assess problems from any vantage point other
than their own—who may not be up to the task of administering justice
equally and impartially.”34  Empathy is a necessary component of good deci-
sionmaking.  In the words of Justice Brennan, a colloquy between head and
heart is “not only an inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an
aspect more to be nurtured than feared.”35  It is desirable because it calls
attention to the tangible human realities hanging in the balance.
The use of empathy should not be equated with judicial activism or with
a view of the judge as an aimless “knight-errant.”36  It is not to be assumed
that judges should disregard the law and decide cases based solely on a per-
sonal sense of justice.  It is foolish, however, to imagine that one’s concep-
tions of justice—formed by one’s experiences—play no role in a judge’s
decisionmaking.  It forms one of the many points of reference employed by
judges.  Each and every judge has experiences that influence the way she
perceives the world.  And a judge’s view of the world will inevitably play a role
in the choices she makes in those instances when she must decide how the
facts of a case fit together, or how an existing rule applies in a new context.37
Empathy does not dictate an outcome or solve issues; it merely permits a
judge to better understand the problems before her.  Empathic adjudication
provides a judge with the capacity to realize that, when balancing interests,
justice cannot simply be the application of an abstract legal theory.  Justice
34 Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1649 (2010); see Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empa-
thy, and the Role of a Judge: The Senate Confirmation Hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U.
BALT. L.F. 1, 18 (2009) (“[T]he inability of judges to empathize with individuals subject to
their judgment, may, in some instances, result in decisions that reflect only the cloistered
perspective of a jurist, disconnected from the everyday experiences of the less fortunate.”).
35 Brennan, supra note 8, at 959.
36 CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 141 (“[The judge] is not a knight-errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles.  He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregu-
lated benevolence.”).
37 For instance, in the context of employment civil rights cases, determining whether
discrimination is present depends chiefly on the judge’s opinion of an employer’s actions
against a plaintiff.  However, “[b]ecause illegal discrimination can operate through
implicit bias rather than overt harassment, the facts and evidence in these cases often
are . . . open to interpretation.”  Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 323 (footnote omit-
ted).  Similarly, according to Justice Brennan, interpreting the Due Process Clause requires
a judge to think with both heart and head. See Brennan, supra note 8, at 966–67 (“[T]he
Due Process Clause demands of judges more than proficiency in logical analysis.  It
requires that we be sensitive to the balance of reason and passion that mark a given age,
and the ways in which that balance leaves its mark on the everyday exchanges between
government and citizen.  In order to do so, we must draw on our own experience as inhabi-
tants of that age, and our own sense of the uneven fabric of social life.”).
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involves bearing in mind the social consequences of decisions.  Such a view
will help the United States judiciary avoid Plessy v. Ferguson-like outcomes.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S MANIFESTATIONS OF EMPATHY38
Notwithstanding the opinion of those who oppose the use of empathy in
judicial adjudication, empathy does not undermine judicial fairness or obser-
vance of the rule of law.  Indeed, the use of empathy in decisionmaking helps
achieve fairness by ensuring that others’ perspectives are considered.39  Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall implicitly emphasized this fact in his dissent in United
States v. Kras.40  In Kras, the majority held that a poor person had to pay the
weekly filing fees required for bankruptcy court, reasoning that the fee was
an inconsequential burden “less than the price of a movie and little more
than the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes.”41  Justice Marshall responded
indignantly: “It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Con-
stitution requires.  But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion to be premised on unfounded assumptions about how people live.”42
Justice Marshall, undeniably inspired by his personal experiences with the
poor, sought to remind the Court of the divide between the Court’s decision
and the realities of those much less fortunate.43  His quote conveys his
acknowledgment that in order to achieve fairness, legal decisionmaking must
take into account human experiences.
38 The role of empathy is not limited to United States courts.  Madame Justice Wilson,
the first female justice of the Canadian Supreme Court, contended that the addition of
female judges to the court would have a substantial impact on tort, criminal, and family law
because “women judges[,] through their differing perspectives on life[,] can bring a new
humanity to bear on the decision-making process.”  Wilson, supra note 26, at 522; see Anita
F. Hill, The Embodiment of Equal Justice Under the Law, 31 NOVA L. REV. 237, 243–44 (2007).
Indeed, an empirical analysis of Canadian courts found that the presence of women judges
influenced decisions in civil liberties cases. See DONALD R. SONGER, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 204–05 (2008).
39 Chris Edelson, Judging in a Vacuum, or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia’s
Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made in Plessy v. Ferguson, 45 AKRON L. REV. 513, 521
(2012) (“Supreme Court decisions do not suffer from acknowledging context and applying
empathy.  To the contrary, these are tools that, when used skillfully, help the Court reach
decisions that correspond to the real world litigants and the general population inhabit.”).
40 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
41 Id. at 449.
42 Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall was outraged by the complete
ignorance the majority displayed concerning how the other half lived. Id. (“It may be easy
for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are no burden.  But no one
who has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin
of survival many of them are. . . . A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a
routine purchase but a luxury . . . . The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie,
which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity.  They have more important
things to do with what little money they have . . . .”).
43 See Davis, supra note 34, at 18–19; Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 345 (using
empirical data to establish that empathic adjudication plays a role in employment civil
rights cases).
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Regardless of whether or not opponents believe empathy should factor
into decisionmaking, the fact is that empathy does influence judicial adjudica-
tion.  Specifically, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (I)44 illustrates the presence of empathic understanding in the United
States’ highest court.45 Brown (I) is a noteworthy case because nine white
Justices were able to place themselves in the shoes of black school children.
They imagined what it would feel like to be isolated because of the color of
one’s skin:46 “To separate [school children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”47  In this excerpt, the Court acknowledged the
sentiments of others, recognizing and reflecting upon the anguish of individ-
uals very different from the Justices themselves.  In doing so, the Court was
able to reach a laudable decision.
Similarly, Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding48 provides
another example of the Supreme Court’s use of empathy in its adjudication.
The importance of empathy is particularly clear when a court must evaluate
whether conduct is “reasonable.”  In Safford, the Supreme Court had to
determine whether a thirteen-year-old student’s Fourth Amendment right
against “unreasonable searches”49 was infringed when she was strip-searched
by school officials who believed she possessed prescription-strength
ibuprofen.50  Under the Fourth Amendment, deciding the constitutionality
of searches by school administrators requires “a careful balancing of govern-
mental and private interests.”51  In order to be deemed constitutional, the
search must be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature
44 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45 See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1593 (1987)
(characterizing the ruling as an example of successful judicial empathy); Sonia Sotomayor,
A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002) (“[W]e should not be so myopic as to
believe that others of different experiences or backgrounds are incapable of understand-
ing the values and needs of people from a different group.  Many are so capable. . . .
[N]ine white men on the Supreme Court in the past have done so on many occasions and
on many issues including Brown.”).
46 See Henderson, supra note 45, at 1608 (noting that the Justices were able to under-
stand racism from the perspective of the black school children, enabling them “to see the
world in a new way and to understand the pain created by law in that world; and to
respond to that pain”); see also Edelson, supra note 39, at 540 (classifying Brown as a tri-
umph of empathy).
47 Brown (I), 347 U.S. at 483, 494 (emphasis added).
48 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wardlaw, supra note 34, at 1649.  If judges failed to under-
stand the perspective of others in such circumstances, “the Fourth Amendment would pre-
serve not society’s reasonable expectations of privacy, but rather the federal judiciary’s.”
The Supreme Court, 2008 Term: Leading Cases—Fourth Amendment—Search by School Officials,
123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 172 (2009).
50 Safford, 557 U.S. at 368.
51 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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of the infraction.”52  Thus, resolving the constitutional issue in Safford
required the Justices to determine how intrusive the search was to the stu-
dent.53  This determination called for more than law; it demanded empathy
for both Miss Redding’s situation and that of the school officials.54
Throughout oral arguments, some Justices seemed to minimize the thir-
teen-year-old girl’s plight.  Justice Breyer, for instance, equated the strip-
search in Safford to changing for gym class: “In my experience when I was 8
or 10 or 12 years old, . . . we did take our clothes off once a day, we changed
for gym, okay?”55  His failure to imagine Miss Redding’s humiliation was
apparent: “I’m trying to work out why is this a major thing to say strip down
to your underclothes, which children do when they change for gym, they do
fairly frequently . . . .”56  Statements like these seemingly prompted Justice
Ginsburg to assist her fellow Justices in comprehending the impact a strip
search might have on a teenage girl.57  She explained to the media, “[The
male Justices] have never been a 13-year-old girl . . . It’s a very sensitive age
for a girl.  I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite
understood.”58
In the end, and most likely with the help of Justice Ginsburg,59 the
Supreme Court concluded that the search was unconstitutional.60  Both Jus-
52 Id. at 342.
53 Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 1966 (2012).
54 See id. (“[T]o ascertain the extent to which the search was ‘intrusive’ to [Miss Red-
ding] . . . .  [The Justices] needed to be able to empathize with her—to understand how
the search would have felt to her and the impact that it would have had upon her.”);
Wardlaw, supra note 34, at 1649–50 (“The judges who heard Safford could not appropri-
ately discharge their duties under [the Fourth Amendment’s] legal test without the capac-
ity to understand the problems confronting the school and the gravity of the ordeal to Miss
Redding.”); see also The Supreme Court, 2008 Term: Leading Cases—Fourth Amendment—Search
by School Officials, supra note 49, at 169 (“Safford was challenging on another, more subtle
level: law alone could not answer the question whether the search was reasonable.”).
55 Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-479.pdf.
56 Id. at 45.  Justice Breyer’s questions are significant and reveal a great deal about his
mode of thinking.  Indeed, he has acknowledged that he attempts to communicate his own
arguments to the other Justices through his questions during oral arguments. See Joan
Biskupic, ‘Dynamic’ duo of Kagan, Sotomayor Add Vigor to Court, USA TODAY (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2011-03-01-courtarguments_
N.htm.
57 See Wardlaw, supra note 34, at 1651.
58 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N
.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
59 See Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at MM22
(“I think [having a woman as part of the conversation in the Safford case] makes people
stop and think, Maybe a 13-year-old girl is different from a 13-year-old boy in terms of how
humiliating it is to be seen undressed.  I think many of [the male Justices] first thought of
their own reaction.  It came out in various questions.  You change your clothes in the gym,
what’s the big deal?” (second alteration in original)).
60 Safford, 557 U.S. 364, 376–77 (2009).
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tice Breyer, by joining the majority, and Justice Souter, by writing the opin-
ion, exhibited a more profound understanding of Miss Redding’s
perspective.  Justice Souter proved that he could fully comprehend the sense
of embarrassment felt by one in Miss Redding’s position by holding that the
reasonableness of a teenage girl’s expectation of privacy “is indicated by the
consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose ado-
lescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure.”61
The decision reached in Safford exemplifies the vital role that compre-
hending the views of another plays in adjudication.  The male Justices had to
use empathy in order to properly resolve the dispute.  The Court would not
have reached a truly just decision had it only considered the interests of the
school district.
III. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S EMPATHY
A. Sotomayor’s Personal History
According to Justice Ginsburg, “[a] system of justice is the richer for the
diversity of background and experience of its participants.”62  Justice
Sotomayor’s background, robust and colorful, undeniably enhances the rich-
ness of the Supreme Court.  Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit
advances this belief: “Her whole experience as part of three discriminated-
against groups . . . I’m talking about ethnicity, gender, and disability—plus
her legal experience, in really being a district judge, really being a Court of
Appeals judge, makes her different from really any Justice that I can think
of . . . .”63  Indeed, as a Latina woman raised in a Bronx housing project and
suffering from Type 1 diabetes,64 Sotomayor has endured experiences that
none of the other Justices can claim to match.
Sotomayor was born and raised in the South Bronx area of New York
City by Puerto Rican parents.65  She grew up in “very modest and challenging
circumstances”66—living in a public housing project with her alcoholic
father67—a factory worker with a sixth-grade education68—her mother, and
her younger brother.  Throughout her childhood, Sotomayor’s family tradi-
61 Id. at 375.
62 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 189,
190 (2003).
63 Lauren Collins, Number Nine: Sonia Sotomayor’s High Profile Debut, NEW YORKER (Jan.
11, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/11/100111fa_fact_collins?cur
rentPage=all (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 273 (2013) (“I’ve lived most of my life ines-
capably aware that it is precious and finite.  The reality of diabetes always lurked in the
back of my mind, and early on I accepted the probability that I would die young.”).
65 Id. at 12.
66 Sonia Sotomayor Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/
sonia-sotomayor-453906?page=1#early-life (last visited Sept 5, 2013) (quoting Sonia
Sotomayor) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 SOTOMAYOR, supra note 64, at 12. R
68 Id. at 61.
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tions cultivated and solidified her Latina identity.69  To Sotomayor, being
Latina is an “ember that blazes forever.”70
While being a Latina gave her the benefit of affirmative action, which
encouraged Princeton University to reach out to her because of her heritage
and academic excellence,71 it also came with a considerable disadvantage—
discrimination.  As an undergraduate at Princeton, it was common for her to
feel like an outsider.  These sentiments were exacerbated by letters she read
in the student-run newspaper that bemoaned the affirmative action students
on campus, “each one of whom had presumably displaced a far more deserv-
ing affluent white male and could rightly be expected to crash into the gutter
built of her own unrealistic aspirations.”72  To Sotomayor, this conduct
amounted to discrimination.  She wrote, “to doubt the worth of minority stu-
dents’ achievement when they succeed is really only to present another face
of the prejudice that would deny them a chance even to try.”73  In order to
ground herself in this new world, Sotomayor avidly participated in the Puerto
Rican groups on campus.  Despite the criticisms leveled at affirmative action
students, Sotomayor did not crash, but ascended to the pinnacle founded
upon her hard-work and dedication.  At graduation she was awarded the uni-
versity’s highest undergraduate award, presented for a combination of aca-
demic success and extracurricular work.74
After graduating from Princeton, Sotomayor attended Yale Law School,
where she was an editor for the Yale Law Journal.75  Immediately upon pass-
ing the bar, she worked as an assistant district attorney in Manhattan.76
There, she prosecuted assaults, robberies, murders, police brutality, and
child pornography cases.77  After five years, she left to work for a commercial
litigation firm, specializing in intellectual property litigation.78  While at the
firm, Sotomayor served on the board of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund (“PRLDEF”).79  It was her pro-bono work with PRLDEF and
other agencies that eventually led to her appointment as a U.S. District Court
Judge for the Southern District of New York.80  In 1998, Judge Sotomayor
became the first Latina to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
69 Id. at 17.  “Part of my Latina identity is the sound of merengue at all our family parties
and the heart wrenching Spanish love songs that we enjoy.”  Sotomayor, supra note 45, at
88.
70 Collins, supra note 63.
71 SOTOMAYOR, supra note 64, at 119. R
72 Id. at 145.
73 Bill Mears, New Sotomayor Memoir Reveals Pain, Joys of an ‘Extraordinary Journey,’ CNN
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/14/living/sotomayor-memoir.
74 SOTOMAYOR, supra note 64, at 162; Adam Liptak, Washington is Home (for Now at R
Least), but Sotomayor Stays True to New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2013, at A13.
75 SOTOMAYOR, supra note 64, at 178. R
76 Sonia Sotomayor Biography, supra note 66. R
77 Id.
78 SOTOMAYOR, supra note 64, at 260–61. R
79 Sonia Sotomayor Biography, supra note 66. R
80 See id.
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Circuit, where she adjudicated a wide array of complicated issues ranging
from constitutional law to complex procedural questions.81
Undeniably, Justice Sotomayor’s experiences, when taken as a whole,
distinguish her from every other Justice on the bench.  Combined with her
background, identity, and disability, her vast work experience contributes to
her inimitability.  Justice Sotomayor, with a seventeen-year career as a district
and circuit court judge, brings more federal judicial experience to the
Supreme Court than any other Justice in a century.82  Her personal history
and training undoubtedly enhance the bench with a different perspective
that has the potential to positively influence the outcomes of cases.
B. Sotomayor’s Notion of Empathy
[T]o understand [others’ points of view] takes time and effort, something
that not all people are willing to give.  For others, their experiences limit
their ability to understand the experiences of others. Other[s] simply do not
care.  Hence, one must accept the proposition that a difference there will be
by the presence of women and people of color on the bench.  Personal
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see. . . . I simply do not
know exactly what that difference will be in my judging.  But I accept there
will be some based on my gender and my Latina heritage.83
For Justice Sotomayor, empathy is a necessary decisionmaking tool
because it serves as a constant reminder of the human existences at stake in
the case.84  Rulings have real-world consequences that materially impact the
lives of the litigants.  Sotomayor concedes that the empathic model of adjudi-
cation can be challenging, especially in the context of empathizing with
those whose experiences are utterly foreign from our own.85  This should
come as no surprise, since utilizing empathy can be so arduous that, on occa-
sion, even Supreme Court Justices are not up to the task.86  Justice
Sotomayor candidly acknowledges that her experiences as a woman of color
have the potential to influence her decisions by determining the lens
through which she perceives the facts of a case.87  This should not be miscon-
strued as bias.  Rather, it simply represents her distinct point of view.  Such
an attitude, although criticized, is hardly revolutionary.  Justice Ginsburg
insists that “women, like persons of different racial groups and ethnic origins,
contribute to the United States judiciary . . . a distinctive medley of views
influenced by differences in biology, cultural impact and life experience.”88
A “medley” of interpretations and viewpoints is to be embraced in judicial
81 Sonia Sotomayor: 10 Things You Should Know, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/26/sonia-sotomayor-10-things_n_207724.html.
82 Id.
83 Sotomayor, supra note 45, at 92.
84 See id. at 92–93.
85 See id. at 92.
86 See supra notes 16–20 and 39–42 and accompanying text.
87 See Sotomayor, supra note 45, at 91.
88 Ginsburg, supra note 62, at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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decisionmaking, for it advances neutrality by safeguarding against the domi-
nation of a particular opinion.
Judges are but mortals and, as such, are not free from individual predis-
positions.  While Justice Sotomayor accepts the existence of these limitations
on judges, she is not fettered by them.89  She instead vigilantly examines her
“assumptions, presumptions and perspectives” in order to make certain that
she “reevaluate[s] them and change[s] [them] as [the] circumstances and
cases before [her] require[ ].”90  Thus, Sotomayor avoids the pitfall of the
truly dangerous judge—the belief that her outlook, formed by her own indi-
vidual experience, is the objective view.  By acknowledging her affinities,
Sotomayor recognizes that her stance is not the only one, and pursues view-
points beyond her own in order to take them into consideration.  Her wealth
of experience, both professional and personal, has facilitated her awareness
of and appreciation for the various points of view latent in each case.  By
empathizing with numerous perspectives, she is better able to respond to the
concerns of not only the parties to a case, but also her colleagues on the
bench.91
C. Sotomayor’s Empathy in Practice
To take the words of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”92  Justice
Sotomayor’s experience facilitates her ability to play a leadership role among
the Court’s liberals for her candor during oral argument and in her written
opinions.93  In her brief time on the bench, she has managed to become the
voice of the liberal Justices and has demonstrated her awareness of the
humanity of the parties whose cases reach the Supreme Court.94
1. Oral Arguments
The perspectives presented through questioning at oral arguments can
have a significant impact on fellow Justices, especially in light of the fact that
oral arguments are the first chance the Justices have to see their colleagues’
attitude toward a case.95  Supreme Court Justices can, and do, utilize oral
89 See Sotomayor, supra note 45, at 93.
90 Id.
91 Remarks by the President Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme
Court, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-
Supreme-Court/ (“[My experience] has helped me to understand, respect, and respond to
the concerns and arguments of all litigants who appear before me, as well as to the views of
my colleagues on the bench.”).
92 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
93 Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2010-2011 U.S. Supreme Court Term,
53 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 314–15 (2011).
94 Liptak, supra note 74. R
95 See Biskupic, supra note 56 (noting that Justice Kagan regards oral arguments as a
medium for “justice-to-justice persuasion”).
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arguments to convey both their legal insights and their life experiences.96
Justice Sotomayor is no exception.  Indeed, she has already solidified herself
as one of the Court’s most outspoken and assertive questioners in oral argu-
ment.97  For instance, in the 2011–2012 Term, Sotomayor posed more ques-
tions during oral arguments than any other Justice outside of Justice Scalia.98
Her thorough inquiries provide a glimpse of her empathic outlook.
In a case concerning the rights of prisoners, Justice Sotomayor posed
questions that demonstrated her compassion and her ability to empathize
with others. Brown v. Plata99 concerned California prisons’ violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.100  In
particular, the severely overcrowded prisons jeopardized the safety of the
inmates.101  The conditions were appalling.  In one prison, up to fifty sick
inmates were contained in a two-hundred-and-forty-square-foot cage for up to
five hours awaiting treatment.102  In another, a prisoner suffering from
severe abdominal pain died after five weeks lapsed before being referred to a
specialist.103
In oral argument, while other Justices were less concerned about the
prisoners’ predicament,104 Justice Sotomayor unmistakably communicated
her position.  When the attorney for the State of California contended that
the time-table for reducing the number of inmates in a prison depended on
the state’s interests, Sotomayor countered, “[I]sn’t [the best interest of the
State of California] to deliver adequate constitutional care to the people that
it incarcerates?”105  When the attorney answered in the affirmative, she con-
tinued “When are you going to avoid the needless deaths . . . ?  When are you
going to avoid or get around people sitting around in their feces for days in a
dazed state?”106  These questions reveal her empathy for the inmates.  Grow-
ing up in poverty enhanced Sotomayor’s ability to identify with the inmates’
situation.  She is no stranger to conditions that are less than ideal, even dan-
gerous—having resided in a building where the stairs were littered with drug
addicts and needles.107  Because Justice Sotomayor faced such circumstances
96 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992) (“At oral arguments . . . Justice Marshall imparted not only his
legal acumen but also his life experiences. . . .”).
97 A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
76, 102–03 (2012).
98 Id. at 103.
99 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
100 Id. at 1922.
101 Id. at 1924.
102 Id. at 1925.
103 Id.
104 For instance, Justice Alito seemed more concerned about the consequences of
releasing the prisoners. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (No.
09-1233).
105 Id. at 15.
106 Id. at 14.
107 SOTOMAYOR, supra note 64, at 19.
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in her childhood, it is arguably easier for her to imagine herself in a hazard-
ous environment that gives rise to severe health risks.
Moreover, Sotomayor’s understanding of the harsh reality accompany-
ing “needless deaths” most likely stems from her time working as an assistant
district attorney.  As a prosecutor, she combated evil-doers in a city inundated
with drugs, street crimes, and murder.108  Through her work, she became
conscious of the pain and suffering borne by families torn apart by the loss of
a loved one.  Indeed, Sotomayor admitted that while supervising a highly
publicized murder case, she learned “the tragic consequences of needless
deaths.”109  This language, echoed in her inquiries, conveys her empathy not
only towards the prisoners, but also for the inmates’ families destroyed by the
loss of their loved ones.
In a controversial 5–4 decision written by Justice Kennedy,110 the
Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge district court’s order that California
decrease its prison population, and held that a population limit is necessary
to remedy the violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights.111  Perhaps influ-
enced by Justice Sotomayor’s passionate inquiries detailing the inhumane
treatment of prisoners, Justice Kennedy wrote: “Prisoners retain the essence
of human dignity inherent in all persons.  Respect for that dignity animates
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.”112
Most recently, Sotomayor’s experiences as a Latina woman have likely
informed her assessment of the difficulties confronting lesbians and gays.113
During oral arguments concerning cases dealing with the Defense of Mar-
riage Act (“DOMA”), her commitment to equality, regardless of sexual orien-
tation, was evident when she asked questions implying a belief in the
existence of illicit discrimination:
Outside of the marriage context, can you think of any other rational
basis . . . for a state using sexual orientation as a factor in denying homosexu-
als benefits?  Or imposing burdens on them?  Is there any other decision-
108 Ann O’Neill, Sotomayor Learned the Ropes on ‘Tarzan Case’, CNN.COM (Jul. 28, 2009,
9:38 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/07/16/
sotomayor.district.attorney/.
109 Id.
110 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).  Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Breyer joined in the majority decision.
111 Id. at 1922.  For an article discussing the controversy surrounding the decision, see
Ben Kerschberg, Supreme Court Addresses Inhumane Conditions in California Prisons, Orders
Release of 46,000 Inmates, FORBES (May 23, 2011, 4:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
benkerschberg/2011/05/23/supreme-court-addresses-inhumane-conditions-in-california-
prisons-orders-release-of-46000-inmates/.
112 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
113 See Sandra Lilley, Analysis: Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s Increasingly Visible Supreme Court
Role, NBC LATINO (Mar. 28, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://nbclatino.com/2013/03/28/analysis-
justice-sonia-sotomayors-increasingly-visible-supreme-court-role/ (“Attorney John Trevin˜o
believes Justice Sotomayor’s experiences as a woman and as a minority inform her perspec-
tives on the challenges facing lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Americans.”).
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making that the government could make—denying them a job, not granting
them benefits of some sort[?]114
As a minority, it is expected that Justice Sotomayor would be more apt to
identify with other minorities, such as sexual minorities.  “The reality of
empathy is that we are more likely to empathize with people similar to our-
selves . . . .”115  Lesbians and gays, classified as sexual minorities,116 share
similar experiences with members of racial and ethnic communities.  For
instance, both racial/ethnic and sexual minorities fall victim to prejudice and
are subjected to disparate treatment by the majority.117  Thus, it is likely that
Justice Sotomayor’s encounters with discrimination—both against Latinos118
and women119—facilitate her ability to relate to the prejudices facing lesbi-
ans and gays.  Sotomayor revealed such an empathic attitude toward classes
of minorities when she asked, “If they’re a class that makes any other discrim-
ination improper, irrational, then why aren’t we treating them as a class for
[marriage]?”120  Her comments at oral argument imply that she is cognizant
of discrimination and its real-world consequences.
In another controversial 5–4 decision written by Justice Kennedy,121 the
Supreme Court ruled that DOMA was unconstitutional.122  The opinion ech-
oes the concerns expressed by Sotomayor in her questions during oral argu-
ments.  Using the same word choice as Sotomayor, the Court held that
DOMA “burden[s]” same-sex couples.123  The majority explicitly recognized
114 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144).  Although it is possible that Sotomayor is using her inquiries to play devil’s
advocate, the fact that she is even able to recognize this argument is illustrative of her
ability to see different perspectives in a case.
115 Henderson, supra note 45, at 1584 (“[E]lites will empathize with the experience of
elites, men empathize with men, women with women, whites with whites.”).
116 Kenneth H. Mayer et al., Sexual and Gender Minority Health: What We Know and What
Needs to Be Done, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 989, 989 (2008).
117 Gregory M. Herek, Race and Sexual Orientation: Commonalities, Comparisons, and Con-
trasts Relevant to Military Policy, UCDAVIS PSYCHOLOGY, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rain-
bow/html/military_race_comparison.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
118 Sotomayor, while a sophomore at Princeton, was subjected to enough class-based
discrimination that she felt compelled to write a piece in Princeton’s student newspaper
titled “Anti-Latino Discrimination at Princeton.”  In the article she expressed her outrage
at the lack of Latino faculty.  In fact, she contended there was not one Puerto Rican or
Chicano faculty member, which she believed reflected a “total absence of regard, concern
and respect” for Latinos and their culture. See Sonia Sotomayor, Anti-Latino Discrimination
at Princeton, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, May 10, 1974 (Republished May 27, 2009), http://www
.dailyprincetonian.com/2009/05/27/23731/.
119 See Oprah Winfrey Network, Exclusive Webisode: Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s Experience with
Casual Sexism, AOL NEWS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://on.aol.com/video/exclusive-webisode—
justice-sonia-sotomayors-experience-with-casual-sexism-517724892 (describing Justice
Sotomayor’s encounters with sexism in the work place).
120 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 14.
121 Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer joined in the majority decision.
Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, and Scalia dissented.
122 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
123 Id. at 2694.
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the Act’s blatant discrimination—a fact emphasized by Sotomayor in her
questioning—when it ruled that DOMA’s “principal purpose is to impose
inequality.”124  The Court found that DOMA “imposes a disability on the
class [of same-sex couples],” and “instructs all federal officials, and indeed all
persons with whom same-sex couples interact . . . that their marriage is less
worthy than the marriages of others.”125
As the above examples illustrate, Justice Sotomayor’s views—shaped by
both her work as a prosecutor and her experiences with poverty, discrimina-
tion, and living with a disability—are crucial to encouraging healthy debate
on the Court.126  Additionally, her ability to empathize with litigants as a
result of those experiences empowers her to identify and combat inequality.
2. Written Opinions
While some people originally expressed fears that Justice Sotomayor’s
use of empathy would result in an unfair bias,127 the Latina Justice has
proven that empathy and impartiality can go hand in hand.  For instance,
when the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari in Cal-
houn v. United States,128 Justice Sotomayor expressed her identification with
the defendant but did not allow it to cloud her decision making.
In Calhoun, the petitioner was on trial for his alleged participation in a
drug conspiracy.129  The primary issue presented was whether Calhoun was
aware that the friends he joined on a road trip were about to participate in a
drug transaction.130  The issue of Calhoun’s intent reached its apex during
the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Calhoun when he testified that he sep-
arated himself from the group after his friend came to the hotel room with a
bag of money.131  At this, the prosecutor pushed Calhoun to clarify why he
124 Id.
125 Id. at 2695–96.  The Court’s majority opinion demonstrates empathy for same-sex
couples as well as their families.  The Court noted that DOMA not only “demeans the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects” but also “humiliates
tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.” Id. at 2694.
126 See Davis, supra note 34, at 19.
127 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, supra note 29, at
6–7 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(“I will not vote for . . . an individual . . . who is not fully committed to fairness and
impartiality toward every person who appears before them. . . . I will not vote for . . . an
individual . . . who believes it is acceptable for a judge to allow their personal background,
gender, prejudices, or sympathies to sway their decision in favor of, or against, parties
before the court. . . . Such an approach to judging means that the umpire calling the game
is not neutral, but instead feels empowered to favor one team over the other.  Call it empa-
thy, call it prejudice, or call it sympathy, but whatever it is, it is not law.”).
128 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013).
129 United States v. Calhoun, 478 F. App’x 193, 194 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1136 (2013).
130 Calhoun, 133 S. Ct. at 1136.
131 Id.
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did not want to be in the hotel room.132  When the district judge instructed
the prosecutor to move on, the prosecutor asked “You’ve got African-Ameri-
cans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of money. Does that tell
you—a light bulb doesn’t go off in your head and say, [t]his is a drug
deal?”133
Imagine the isolation and humiliation felt by Calhoun, an African-Amer-
ican, in that instance.  Envision the feeling of hopelessness incited by such a
racially prejudiced comment—uttered during a proceeding meant to
embody justice and equality.  Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, did.
She asserted “By suggesting that race should play a role in establishing a
defendant’s criminal intent, the prosecutor here tapped a deep and sorry
vein of racial prejudice that has run through the history of criminal justice in
our Nation.”134
The influence of her experience living as a minority allowed her to easily
assume the viewpoint of those in Calhoun’s situation.  Undeniably, Justice
Sotomayor’s background enabled her to recognize the social consequences
of such conduct on minorities’ faith in the justice system, stating it “dimin-
ishes the dignity of our criminal justice system and undermines respect for
the rule of law.”135  One can sense her empathy for Calhoun and her indig-
nity at the thought of being considered anything less than equal when she
maintains, “We expect the Government to seek justice, not to fan the flames
of fear and prejudice.”136
Despite the objectionable actions of the prosecution and of the govern-
ment,137 Justice Sotomayor did not opine that the Supreme Court should
take this case to correct a clear injustice.  Instead, she acknowledged that
Calhoun’s counsel neglected to object to the question at trial and, as a result,
the lower court’s decision was subject to the stringent “plain-error review”
standard.138  Since Calhoun did not attempt to make that showing and
offered new arguments in its place, Justice Sotomayor determined that these
contentions were waived because he failed to make them on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit.139  Even when confronted with blatant prejudice, Sotomayor
looked to the law and agreed that the case should not be granted certiorari.
Thus, Calhoun serves as an exemplification of the reality that Justice
Sotomayor firmly grounds her decisions in law.
Sotomayor has also demonstrated her ability to listen and be influenced
by others’ perspectives—further disproving the accusation that empathy gives
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1137.
135 Id. at 1138.
136 Id.
137 Justice Sotomayor also lamented the government’s response to the prosecutor’s
actions.  Particularly, she accused the government of failing to recognize the injustice of
the prosecutor’s question. Id.
138 See id. at 1136–37.
139 See id.
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rise to unfair bias.  While an appellate judge on the Second Circuit,
Sotomayor seemed to empathize more with the government, a characteristic
most likely attributable to her tenure as a prosecutor.140  Sotomayor’s empa-
thy for the government manifested itself most in cases concerning police
searches and the use of evidence.141  For instance, in United States v. Falso,142
then-Judge Sotomayor upheld the defendant’s child pornography conviction
even though the FBI agent searched his home pursuant to a search warrant
that was wrongfully issued due to the lack of probable cause.143  Sotomayor
maintained that the evidence could still be used against the defendant
because the agent’s conduct fell under the good faith exception.144  Simi-
larly, in United States v. Santa,145 the police discovered crack after arresting
and searching the defendant based on a mistaken belief that the defendant
was wanted on an outstanding warrant.146  Then-Judge Sotomayor affirmed
the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress because
“[t]here is no indication [in the record] that the arresting officer[s] w[ere]
not acting objectively reasonably when [they] relied upon the police com-
puter record.”147
However, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,148 Justice Sotomayor made a con-
scious attempt to understand the defendant’s perspective and, in doing so,
ruled against the government. J.D.B. involved a thirteen-year-old seventh
grader who was removed from his classroom by a police officer, escorted to a
conference room, and questioned by two cops and school administrators for
thirty to forty-five minutes.149  His legal custodian was never notified, nor was
he informed of his Miranda rights, or his right to leave the room.150  After
being threatened with juvenile detention, J.D.B. confessed to committing
break-ins.151  At that point, the officer informed J.D.B. that he could decline
to answer questions and was free to leave.152  The police searched his home,
located the stolen goods, and charged the youth with breaking and entering
140 See James Oliphant, Sotomayor is Remembered as a Zealous Prosecutor, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 9,
2009), http://www.latimes.com/la-na-sotomayor-prosecutor9-2009jun09,0,1224643.story?
page=1 (reporting that a defense lawyer, who appeared before her while she was federal
district judge, noticed that she leaned toward the government). But see Linda Greenhouse,
The Roberts Court, Version 4.0, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full
page.html?res=9801EFDA123BF930A35753C1A9669D8B63 (“[During her initial Term]
Justice Sotomayor voted for the rights of criminal defendants more often than any other
justice except Justice Stevens.”).
141 See Oliphant, supra note 140.
142 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
143 Id. at 120.
144 Id. at 125–29.
145 180 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1999).
146 Id. at 22.
147 Id. at 30 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
149 Id. at 2399.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 2400.
152 Id.
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along with larceny.153  J.D.B’s attorney moved to suppress the statements
made by J.D.B and any evidence derived from them, alleging that J.D.B. was
interrogated while in custody without being afforded Miranda warnings.154
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor held that a child’s age must
factor into the Miranda custody analysis if the interrogating officer knew the
child’s age at the time of questioning, or if the age “would have been objec-
tively apparent to a reasonable officer.”155  Although Justice Sotomayor
demonstrated her empathy towards the government by recognizing that an
objective custody inquiry “avoids burdening police with the task of anticipat-
ing the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect,”156 she maintained that
incorporating age in the analysis would not be overly burdensome on law
enforcement or courts.157
Justice Sotomayor revealed her willingness to actively take into account
the positions of others by drawing on the argument advanced in an amicus
curiae brief for the petitioner.  One of her main rationales for including age
in the analysis rested on the belief that children are particularly vulnerable to
the pressures of police interrogations, and are therefore more likely to give a
false confession.158  This contention was advanced in an amicus curiae brief,
which outlined a series of cases illustrating that children have confessed
falsely to offenses as significant as murder.159  It insisted that a decision that
failed to consider a child’s age would contribute to wrongful convictions of
innocent children.160
Sotomayor, always concerned about the real-life consequences of judicial
decisions on individuals, was likely prompted by these empirical findings to
place herself in the child’s position.  She made the effort to imagine what it
would feel like to be a thirteen-year-old interrogated by police officers.  In so
doing, she determined that it should be obvious to “anyone who was a child
once himself, including any police officer or judge” that “a reasonable child
subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when
a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”161  This case exemplifies
Sotomayor’s ability to recognize and assess the differing perspectives of the
many parties involved in litigation, as well as her endeavor never to forget the
concrete human realities at stake in a case.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2406.
156 Id. at 2402.
157 Id. at 2407.
158 Id. at 2401.
159 See Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09–11121).
160 Id. at 29.
161 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403.
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CONCLUSION
The ideal judge is one who makes decisions firmly grounded in the law,
while concomitantly taking into account the humanity latent in the contro-
versy and the societal impact of the decision.  A judge can only truly grasp the
human consequences of a decision through empathy.  Empathic decision-
making encourages a judge to perceive and consider the various stances of
the litigants before her.  Only by recognizing the differing viewpoints can a
judge adequately weigh the interests at stake in the case.  In this way, empa-
thy produces more equitable results than a formalist or quasi-formalist
approach to adjudication.  Refuting those who criticize empathic decision-
making, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that empathy can, and should,
play an integral role in the judicial process to reach more just decisions.
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor understands that empathy is a
necessary decisionmaking tool.  She brings with her a distinctive background
and heritage, as well as an unparalleled level of experience as a judge in the
lower courts.  Consequently, she is able to give a voice to those who are typi-
cally less heard by recognizing and comprehending the perspectives of
others.  As a woman who has suffered poverty, discrimination, and a disabil-
ity, she can view the world through many lenses.  Her inherent lenses, how-
ever, cannot address every vantage point, thus she urges herself to identify
and evaluate those viewpoints with which she is less familiar.  Indeed, she has
demonstrated that she is willing to adopt other viewpoints.  Justice
Sotomayor’s training and history enriches the bench with a novel outlook
and encourages robust debates that serve to positively influence decisions.
Her desire to comprehend perspectives beyond her immediate experience
empowers her to curb her presumptions, combat inequality, and bear in
mind the human lives hanging in the balance.
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